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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-
103(2)( e ). 
The district court issued its Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v. 
Courtney, District Court Case No. 131900508, on December 30, 2013 (R. 184-85; 
attached at Addendum A). On December 1, 2014, the district court reinstated 
Appellant Carl Courtney's time to file an appeal (R. 249), and a notice of appeal 
was timely filed on December 26, 2014 (R. 254). 
Statement of the Issues 
Issue 1: Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting Mr. 
Courtney's 2012 drug distribution conviction under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) to show 
intent. 
Standard of Review: Appellate courts review a n trial court's decision to 
admit evidence under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence under an abuse 
of discretion standard." State v. Lucero, 2014UT15,111, 328 P.3d 841 (quotation 
omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R. 280: 7-15.) 
1 
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Issue 2: Whether Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective (1) for not 
objecting when the State offered the details of Mr. Courtney's 2012 conviction 
under Rule 404(b); (2) for not objecting to the admission of a witness's Rule 
404(b) evidence that she had seen Mr. Courtney sell drugs before; and (2) for 
failing to subpoena an important witness. 
Standard of Review: 11 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised 
for the first time on appeal presents a question of law that the court reviews for 
correctness." Lucero, 2014UT15,111 (quotation omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is not preserved. But an II exception to the 
preservation requirement is where trial counsel's failure to preserve the issue in 
the trial court is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Kozlov, 
2012 UT App 114, iJ 35, 276 P.3d 1207. 
Determinative Provisions 
The following provisions and cases are set forth at Addendum B: 
• Utah R. Evid. 404 
• Utah Code§ 58-37-8 
• Utah Code § 58-37a-5 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Statement of the Case 
In August 2010, a police officer1 stopped Mr. Courtney while he was 
looking for a child in a parking lot of an apartment complex. (R. 1; 280:109-10, 
118.) Because Mr. Courtney appeared fidgety, the officer asked to search Mr. 
Courtney, and he consented. (R. 280: 111.) The officer found on Mr. Courtney a 
pocket knife, 60 small Ziploc baggies, and a piece of paper with names and dollar 
amounts written on it (an "owe sheet"). (R. 280:111-12.) Mr. Courtney told the 
officer that he carried the knife for protection, that the owe sheet was not his, and 
that the baggies were for his coin collection. (R. 280:117-18.) 
Believing that the items on Mr. Courtney were drug paraphernalia, the 
officer placed Mr. Courtney under arrest and drove Mr. Courtney to his 
girlfriend's apartment that was in the same complex as the parking lot. (R. 
280:118-19.) Mr. Courtney requested that the officer take him to his girlfriend's2 
1 Officer Don Johnson-the police officer that stopped, searched, and 
arrested Mr. Courtney-was later charged with drug crimes of his own. See 
"Former Utah narcotics officer charged with drug crimes," Salt Lake Tribune O an. 
27, 2015), http://www.sltrib.com/ news/ 2107 471-155 / former-utah-narcotics-
officer-charged-with. 
2 Mr. Courtney's girlfriend dated Mr. Courtney from 2007 to 2010. (R. 
280:183.) Even though at the time of trial Mr. Courtney was no longer dating his 
girlfriend, for ease, she will be referred throughout this brief as Mr. Courtney's 
girlfriend. Mr. Courtney dated his wife on and off for about 19 years, and they 
married in 2013, right before Mr. Courtney's trial. (R. 281:35.) 
3 
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aparhnent because his daughter was staying at the apartment and he needed to 
make arrangements to get his daughter to school. (R. 280:118-20.) 
When the officer arrived at the girlfriend's aparhnent, Mr. Courtney 
stayed in the police car while the officer approached the girlfriend. (R. 280:120-
21.) The girlfriend gave her consent for the police to search her car, which Mr. 
Courtney had driven to her aparhnent that morning. (R. 280:120-21.) The officer 
retrieved the keys to the car from the girlfriend. (R. 280:121-22.) Inside the car, 
the police found a pouch that contained a needle and some methamphetamine. 
(R. 280: 122-24.) 
The State then charged Mr. Courtney with two counts: (1) Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, in violation of Utah Code § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iii), and (2) Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code § 
58-37a-5(1). (R. 1.) 
Before trial began, Mr. Courtney's counsel did not file a request for notice 
of Rule 404(b) evidence. However, the State filed a notice of 404(b) evidence on 
its own accord, seeking to admit evidence of a crime Mr. Courtney committed 
two years after the charged conduct in this case. (See R. 40-42; attached at 
Addendum C.) Specifically, the State sought to admit evidence of a 2012 
conviction, where, as part of a controlled buy, Mr. Courtney sold 
methamphetamine to a confidential informant in a hotel room. (R. 41.) The State 
4 
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argued that Mr. Courtney's distribution of drugs on a subsequent occasion was 
indicative of his intent to distribute drugs in this case. (R. 280:8-9.) The trial court 
admitted evidence of the 2012 conviction under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) for the 
purpose of showing intent. (R. 280:14-15; attached at Addendum D.) But the 
court stated that it was disinclined to admit the specific facts underlying that 
conviction because the 2012 crime and the crime charged in this case were too 
dissimilar. (R. 280:19-20.) 
At trial, a witness for the State testified about the details underlying Mr. 
Courtney's 2012 conviction. (R. 280:16; 281:20-23; attached at Addendum E.) Mr. 
Courtney's counsel did not object to the admission of that evidence. (R. 281:20-
23.) 
Also during trial, Mr. Courtney's girlfriend testified in the State's case-in-
chief. The State questioned her about Mr. Courtney's prior drug use and drug 
distribution, and she testified that Mr. Courtney had used drugs in the past, had 
sold her drugs, and had sold drugs to others for money. (R. 280:193-94; attached 
at Addendum F.) Mr. Courtney's counsel never objected to the girlfriend's 
testimony. (Id.) 
During trial a police officer also testified that an owe sheet- like the one 
found on Mr. Courtney-is typically used by drug dealers to keep track of what 
is owed to them. (R. 280:111-12.) Mr. Courtney testified that the owe sheet was 
5 
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not his and was in fact Missy Amy's. (R. 281:55-57.) He testified that Ms. Amy 
had loaned money to others, and Mr. Courtney was using the sheet to collect on 
the debts owed to her. (Id.) Ms. Amy did not testify at the trial. 
After deliberations, the jury convicted Mr. Courtney on possession with 
intent to distribute and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R. 184.) The trial court 
sentenced Mr. Courtney to 1 to 15 years for possession with intent to distribute 
and 0 to 6 months for possession with drug paraphernalia, with the sentences to 
run concurrently. (R. 184-85.) 
Summary of the Argument 
Issue 1: The district court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence 
of Mr. Courtney's 2012 drug distribution conviction under Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
The evidence was too prejudicial than probative because the 2012 drug 
distribution conviction was not similar to the charged crimes and the time gap 
between the two events was too great. 
Issue 2: Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective by (1) not objecting to 
a witness's testimony that described the details underlying Mr. Courtney's 2012 
drug distribution conviction; (2) not requesting notice of 404(b) evidence and 
then not objecting to the girlfriend's 404(b) evidence; and (3) not issuing a 
subpoena for an important witness, Missy Amy. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court can determine on the record that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object and for failing to request notice. In this regard, trial counsel's 
performance was deficient because the trial court would have excluded the 
evidence of the details underlying the 2012 conviction and the girlfriend's 404(b) 
evidence as improper, irrelevant, or too prejudicial. And Mr. Courtney was 
prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance; the State had to prove that Mr. 
Courtney intended to distribute the drugs found in the car, and this testimony 
painted Mr. Courtney as a long-time drug dealer. 
Mr. Courtney has filed a Utah R. App. P. 23B motion requesting remand to 
supplement the record for his claim that his counsel was ineffective for not 
issuing a subpoena for an important witness. Mr. Courtney maintained 
throughout his arrest and his trial that the owe sheet was not his and was Missy 
Amy's. Further development of the record will show that Mr. Courtney's counsel 
knew that Ms. Amy would testify that the owe sheet was hers but failed to 
subpoena Ms. Amy, and Ms. Amy did not appear at trial. Mr. Courtney was 
prejudiced because the owe sheet was a pivotal piece of evidence for the State to 
show that Mr. Courtney intended to distribute the drugs found in the car. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Argument 
1. The hial court abused its discretion in admitting Mr. Courbtey's 2012 
drug distribution conviction under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) to show intent. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) prohibits evidence of bad acts to be used to "prove a 
person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted 
in conformity with the character." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, the rule 
does allow such evidence to be admitted to prove intent. Utah R. Evid. 404(b )(2). 
Courts engage in a three-pronged analysis to determine the admissibility 
of Rule 404(b) evidence. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ,r,r 20-24, 993 P.2d 837. 
"[T]o be admissible, evidence of prior bad acts must be [1] relevant and [2] 
offered for a genuine, noncharacter purpose; furthermore, [3] the probative value 
of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,r 13, 328 P.3d 841. But" evidence of prior 
bad acts often will yield dual inferences - and thus betray both a permissible 
purpose and an improper one." State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,r 16, 296 P.3d 673. 
"That's what makes many rule 404(b) questions so difficult: Evidence of prior 
misconduct often presents a jury with both a proper and an improper inference, 
and it won't always be easy for the court to differentiate the two inferences or to 
limit the impact of the evidence to the purpose permitted under the rule." Id. 
8 
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VP 
Mr. Courtney's arrest in this case occurred in 2010. (R. 280:7.) The State 
sought to admit evidence of a conviction of a crime that occurred in 2012, where, 
as part of a controlled buy, Mr. Courtney sold methamphetamine to a 
confidential informant in a hotel room. (R. 41.) The district court admitted 
evidence of the conviction under Rule 404(b) as indicative of intent. (R. 280:14-
15.)3 But in conducting the three-prong analysis, the district court abused its 
discretion when it decided that the probative value of the evidence outweighed 
its prejudicial effect. 
In determining whether evidence is more prejudicial than probative, 
district courts evaluate several factors, including 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the 
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, 
and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse 
the jury to overmastering hostility. 
3 "Evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) may relate to conduct occurring 
either before or after the charged offense." United States v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1281, 
1298 (10th Cir. 2011); see State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ,r,r 64-65, 256 P.3d 1102 
(noting that the state and federal versions of Rule 404(b) are identical and relying 
on federal caselaw to answer a 404(b) question). 
9 
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State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ,r 24, 108 P.3d 730 (quotation omitted). Here, the lack of 
similarity of the crimes and the lengthy interval of time between the crimes are 
pivotal factors that weigh against admission of the 2012 conviction. 
Similarities between the crimes. The 2012 conviction and the crimes charged 
in this case are vastly different. In this case, a police officer stopped Mr. Courtney 
while he was looking for a child in a parking lot. (R. 280:109-10.) The police 
officer asked and Mr. Courtney consented to a search of his person. (R. 280:111.) 
The search revealed 60 small Ziploc baggies and an owe sheet. (R. 280:111-12.) 
The police officer took Mr. Courtney into custody and drove him to his 
girlfriend's apartment. (R. 280:117-18.) Police officers searched the girlfriend's 
car, which Mr. Courtney had been driving earlier that day; the officers had to 
retrieve keys from the girlfriend to open the car. (R. 280:121-22.) In the car, the 
police found a needle and some methamphetamine inside a pouch. (R. 280: 122-
24.) 
In contrast, the 2012 crime involved an undercover operation. (R. 281:20.) 
A confidential informant set up a purchase of methamphetamine from a target 
individual at a hotel. (R.281:21.) When the undercover officer and the 
confidential informant arrived at the hotel, four people were in the room, 
including Mr. Courtney and the target individual. (R. 281:22.) The confidential 
10 
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informant sat down at a table with Mr. Courtney and purchased 
methamphetamine in a small baggy from Mr. Courtney. (R. 281:25.) 
The only similarities between these crimes are the drug-
methamphetamine - and presence of at least one small baggy. The State could 
not produce any evidence that the baggy was specially marked with a logo or a 
decal. (R. 280:12.) The trial court recognized that the baggies were not "unique" 
or "remarkable" because "distribution usually involves a baggy." (R. 280:18-19.) 
And the court even recognized that the two crimes were not similar. ( See R. 
280:19-20 (reasoning that the court did not "see enough similarity there to take 
the time to go through all the facts [of the 2012 conviction] again").) 
Other than the presence of one banal baggy and methamphetamine, no 
-other similarities exist between the 2012 conviction and the charged conduct in 
this case. The location was different for both crimes - a hotel room and a parking 
lot. (Compare R. 280:109-11 with R. 281:22, 25.) In 2012, Mr. Courtney was at a 
table with drugs, and here, Mr. Courtney had no drugs on his person. ( Compare 
R. 280:111-12 with R. 281:22, 25.) In 2012, Mr. Courtney was with a group of 
people, and one of them was a target of an undercover operation; here, Mr. 
Courtney was alone. (Compare R. 280:109 with R. 281:21-22.) In 2012, the drugs 
were in the same room as Mr. Courtney; in this case, the police found the drugs 
in a locked car away from where Mr. Courtney was arrested, and Mr. Courtney 
11 
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no longer had the keys. (Compare R. 280:121-22 with R. 281:25.) The differences 
between this case and the 2012 conviction are too significant to be probative to 
the jury. 
Interval of time that elapsed between the crimes. Also, the interval of time 
between the 2012 conviction and the charged crimes is too lengthy. Here, two 
years separated the crimes. (R. 280:13.) 
In one case, a five-month gap separated the charged crime and the 404(b) 
crimes. United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 722 (6th Cir. 2002).4 There, the 
court determined that the five-month timespan was "of sufficient length to 
require a greater similarity between the two events" and that the 404(b) crime 
was too dissimilar to be admissible. Id. 
Likewise, the two-year gap here required the charged crimes and the 2012 
conviction to have greater similarity. And as discussed above, the only 
similarities between the 2012 conviction and the charged crimes are the drug and 
the presence of a small, nondescript baggy. Otherwise, the circumstances of the 
crimes are completely different. One crime occurred in a hotel room and the 
other in a parking lot; Mr. Courtney had drugs on him in one crime but not in the 
other; many individuals were present in one case, and Mr. Courtney was alone in 
4 Utah courts may refer to federal case law to resolve Rule 404(b) questions 
because the text of the state and federal versions of Rule 404(b) is identical. State 
v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, 1164-65, 256 P.3d 1102. 
12 
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the other. The vast dissimilarity of the crimes and the two-year time gap render 
the evidence of the 2012 conviction inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because the 
evidence is too prejudicial and insufficiently probative. 
Other courts have determined that prior distribution evidence is not admissible 
under Rule 404(b) for purposes of showing intent. Other courts have recognized the 
hazards of admitting prior drug distribution evidence to show the defendant's 
intent to distribute; these courts reason such evidence is too prejudicial and not 
sufficiently probative. These courts caution that such evidence is only "probative 
of present intent to possess and distribute when the prior distributions were part 
of the same scheme or involved a similar modus operandi as the present offense." 
United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432,443 (6th Cir. 2008). "[T]he fact that a defendant 
has intended to possess and distribute drugs in the past does not logically 
compel the conclusion that he presently intends to possess and distribute drugs." 
Id. at 443-44. "The only way to reach the conclusion that the person currently has 
the intent to possess and distribute based solely on evidence of unrelated prior 
convictions for drug distribution is by employing the very kind of reasoning-
i.e., once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer-which 404(b) excludes." Id. at444; 
see United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[A]dmission of prior 
drug crimes to prove intent to commit present drug crimes has become too 
routine.") 
13 
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In this case, the 2012 conviction and the charged crimes were too 
dissimilar. The trial court recognized the lack of similarity between the two 
events; even though the court allowed the State to introduce evidence of the 2012 
conviction, the court boiled the State's argument on similarity down to "look he 
sold dope over here and he's in possession of dope over here that we contend he 
was intending to sell." (R. 280:20.) The State did not produce any evidence that 
the two crimes shared a modus operandi or any common scheme or plan. (R. 
280:12, 18-20.) The 2012 conviction simply was not probative of Mr. Courtney's 
intent to distribute in this case. Instead, evidence of the 2012 conviction was 
overly prejudicial because the jury was at risk of engaging in a "once a drug 
dealer, always a drug dealer" type of reasoning that is contrary to Rule 404(b). 
See Bell, 516 F.3d at 443. 
The jury instructions did not relieve the prejudice to Mr. Courtney. Limiting 
jury instructions may alleviate the prejudicial effect of Rule 404(b) evidence. See 
State v. Marchet, 2012 UT App 197, ,I 14,284 P.3d 668. But such instructions are 
"not, however, a sure-fire panacea for the prejudice resulting from the needless 
admission of [404(b)] evidence." Haywood, 280 F.3d at 724. Although the trial 
court only admitted the 2012 conviction for the purpose of showing intent, the 
trial court instructed the jury that the 2012 conviction could be used to show not 
only intent but also know ledge, motive, mistake, and accident. ( Compare R. 
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280:14-15 with R. 281:110.) Such imprecision in defining for the jury how it 
should use character evidence is "troubling," United States v. Stephens, 549 F.3d 
459,463 (6th Cir. 2008), and does not alleviate the prejudice to Mr. Courtney. 
The admission of the 2012 conviction was not harmless error. Mr. Courtney was 
harmed by the trial court's admission of the 2012 conviction. An appellate court 
"will not disturb the jury's verdict unless the likelihood of a different outcome is 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. State v. High, 2012 UT 
App 180, ,r 41, 282 P.3d 1046 ( quotation omitted). "Harmless errors are those 
that are sufficiently inconsequential so no reasonable likelihood exists that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Id. ( quotations omitted). 
Utah courts have "previously held improper comments concerning prior 
convictions to be harmful" and "[i]n close cases, the substantive use of a prior 
conviction can often tilt the balance in favor of conviction." State v. Emmett, 839 
P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1992). And in cases where the evidence against the defendant 
was not sufficiently strong or clearly supportive of either party, courts "cannot 
say that there is no reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been 
different if the jury had not been presented with" prior bad acts evidence. State v. 
Leber, 2010 UT App 387, ,r 18, 246 P.3d 163. 
Here, the evidence against Mr. Courtney was not overwhelming. The 
methamphetamine was not found on him; rather, it was found in his girlfriend's 
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car. (R. 280: 122-24.) And when the police found the methamphetamine, the car 
was locked and the keys were in the possession of the girlfriend. (R. 280:121-22.) 
Mr. Courtney told the police that the baggies found on him were for coin 
collecting and that the owe sheet found on him was not his. (R. 280:117-18.) 
Essential to the State's assertion that Mr. Courtney intended to distribute the 
methamphetamine was Mr. Courtney's prior conviction for distribution. Without 
the evidence of the 2012 conviction, there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. 
In sum, the 2012 conviction and the crimes in this case are too dissimilar 
and too far apart in time; consequently, the probative value of the 2012 
conviction did not outweigh the prejudice to Mr. Courtney, and that prejudice 
was not harmless and was not alleviated by the imprecise jury instruction. The 
trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of the 2012 conviction. 
16 
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·w) 
2. Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective. 
For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy the 
Strickland5 standard, which requires a defendant to prove 11 (1) that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,r 18,321 P.3d 1136 (quotation omitted). "Proving 
that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
requires [the defendant] to rebut the strong presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." 
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ,r 34,247 P.3d 344 (quotations omitted). 
Mr. Courtney has three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, 
Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a witness's 
testimony that detailed the underlying facts of Mr. Courtney's 2012 conviction. 
Second, trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting notice of 404(b) evidence 
and then failing to object to that evidence during the trial. These two claims can 
be determined on the record that is presently before this Court. 
5 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). 
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Mr. Courtney's third ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires 
remand pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B. In that claim, Mr. Courtney asserts that 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena an important witness. 
In all instances, Mr. Courtney was prejudiced because his counsel's 
failures harmed his ability to show that he had no intent to distribute the drugs 
found in his girlfriend's car. 
2.1 On the record, Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to evidence that detailed the underlying facts of 
his 2012 conviction 
Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a 
witness's testimony that detailed the underlying facts of the 2012 conviction. 
For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to object to 
testimony, courts consider whether the "objection[] would have been futile," "if 
there was a sound tactical basis for not [objecting]," and whether "without 
counsel's errors the result would have been more favorable" to the defendant. 
State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ,r,r 33-34, 248 P.3d 984. 
In its ruling on the State's notice to admit 404(b) evidence, the trial court 
specifically discussed whether the underlying facts of Mr. Courtney's 2012 
conviction could be admitted. After determining that that the 2012 conviction 
was admissible to show intent, the trial court discussed how the conviction 
should be admitted. (R. 280:14-16.) The court told the attorneys that it was 
11 concerned" about the State submitting evidence about the controlled buy. (R. 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
280:16.) The court questioned the State about the lack of similarity between the 
2012 conviction and the charged crimes. (R. 280:17-19.) Then the court stated: 
I think with respect to the specific facts in the case of 2012 
that we just tried, I think my inclination is to disallow 
you getting into all those facts unless, unless there is 
similarity, a common plan or scheme. In other words, he 
did something in this distribution case that is similar, and 
I mean remarkably similar, not just baggy here, baggy 
here. 
(R. 280:19.) Then the court continued: "[I]f we're just saying look he sold dope 
over here and he's in possession of dope over here that we contend he was 
intending to sell, I just don't see enough similarity there to take the time to go 
through all those facts again." (R. 280:20.) 
At trial, the State's witness testified about the 2012 undercover operation. 
(R. 281:20-21.) The purpose of the operation was to purchase methamphetamine, 
and the witness testified about where the controlled buy occurred and who the 
target of the investigation was. (R. 281:21.) Then the witness testified about what 
he saw when he arrived at the location of the controlled buy- he saw multiple 
individuals in the room, including Mr. Courtney. (R. 281:22.) Then the witness 
testified that Mr. Courtney sold methamphetamine. (R. 281:22.) Finally, the 
witness testified that a jury found Mr. Courtney guilty of distribution of 
methamphetamine, and the State submitted a certified copy of the guilty verdict 
to the jury. (R. 281:23.) During this testimony, Mr. Courtney's counsel did not 
object, but he did cross-examine the witness. (R. 281:20-25.) And the State did not 
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offer any additional evidence to show that the 2012 crime and the charged crimes 
were similar. 
Mr. Courtney's counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the 
witness's testimony of the underlying details of the 2012 conviction when the 
trial court had previously stated that it was disinclined to allow such testimony. 
Because the trial court had already expressed its unwillingness to let in such 
information, the objection would not have been futile. And although an attorney 
may properly strategize to not "draw[] the jury's attention to certain facts or 
over-emphasiz[ e] aspects of the facts," trial counsel did cross-examine the 
witness on the facts of the 2012 conviction, so trial counsel's strategy was not to 
minimize the impact of the facts underlying the conviction. See State v. Ott, 2010 
UT 1, ,r 39 (holding that an attorney was ineffective for failing to object to a 
victim impact statement when the attorney could have filed a motion in limine to 
exclude the statement and the statement violated precedent). 
Furthermore, as argued in Part 1, supra, the evidence of the 2012 conviction 
prejudiced Mr. Courtney. The evidence against Mr. Courtney was not strong, 
and the 2012 conviction was key to the State proving Mr. Courtney's intent to 
distribute. Moreover, Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by the admission of the facts 
underlying the 2012 conviction. Those facts show Mr. Courtney involving 
himself with a suspected or known drug dealer, one who was known well 
enough to the police to be the target of an undercover operation. (See R. 281:21.) 
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Those facts cast Mr. Courtney as a drug dealer who associates with known drug 
dealers and makes it far more likely that Mr. Courtney intended to sell the drugs 
that were in his girlfriend's car. 
The facts underlying the 2012 conviction were more prejudicial to Mr. 
Courtney than the mere fact that he had been convicted at one point of drug 
distribution. Consequently, Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by his counsel's failure 
to object, and without the evidence of the facts underlying the 2012 conviction, it 
is reasonably likely that the result of the trial would have been different. 
2.2 On the record, Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request notice of 404(b) evidence and failing to object to 
the 404(b) evidence offered by the girlfriend 
Mr. Courtney's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request notice of 
404(b) evidence and then failing to object to that evidence at trial. Courts engage 
in a similar analysis when determining whether trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request notice and whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to evidence during trial. 
For a claim that counsel failed to request notice of 404(b) evidence, the 
question before the court is "how the State's ... disclosure would have been 
addressed by the ?"ial court had 404(b) notice been requested and whether this 
would have given rise to a reasonable probability of a more favorable result for 
[the defendant]." State v. Alvarado, 2014 UT App 87, 1 26, 325 P.3d 116. It is the 
defendant's request that triggers the notice requirement. See Utah R. Evid. 
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404(b )(2) (requiring prosecutor to give notice 11 [ o ]n request by a defendant in a 
criminal case"); see United States v. Aguilar, 59 F. App'x 326, 328 (10th Cir. 2003) 
("[A]ccording to Rule 404(b), pretrial notice is required only when the defense 
requests such advance notice."). 
And as recited above, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure 
to object requires a court to consider whether the II objection[] would have been 
futile," "if there was a sound tactical basis for not [objecting]," and whether 
"without counsel's errors the result would have been more favorable" to the 
defendant. King, 2010 UT App 396, ,r,r 33-34. 
Taking these two tests together, analyzing an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim for failure to request notice of 404(b) evidence and for failure to 
object to that evidence requires a court to determine (1) whether the 404(b) 
evidence would have been admissible and (2) whether Mr. Courtney was 
prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. In this case, the 404(b) evidence 
from Mr. Courtney's girlfriend would have been excluded had trial counsel 
requested- and received - notice, and had trial counsel objected to that evidence. 
Furthermore, Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by the introduction of the evidence, 
as it painted him as a long-time drug dealer, and that evidence was pivotal for 
the State to prove that Mr. Courtney intended to distribute the drugs in the 
girlfriend's car. 
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A review of the record in this case shows that Mr. Courb.ley' s trial counsel 
never filed any request for notice of Rule 404(b) evidence; the record is 
completely devoid of such a request. 6 See Utah R. Evid. 404(b )(2) (requiring 
prosecutor to give notice 11 [ o ]n request by a defendant in a criminal case"). And 
during the State's case-in-chief, the State questioned Mr. Courtney's girlfriend as 
follows: 
Q: While you dated Mr. Courtney, were you aware if 
he used any controlled substances: 
A: Yes. 
Q: Were you aware if he used methamphetamine? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did he use methamphetamine? 
A: Yes .... 
Q: Were you present while he-have you ever been 
present while he has used methamphetamine? 
A: Yes. 
Q: When you used methamphetamine with him, 
how did you obtain the methamphetamine? 
A: Fromhim. 
Q: How did he use methamphetamine? 
A: With a needle .... 
Q: During your relationship and while you were 
using methamphetamine with Mr. Courtney, have you 
seen him distribute or give methamphetamine to other 
people? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Have you seen him distribute or give 
methamphetamine to other people for money? 
A: Yes. 
6 It appears, however, that the State filed a notice of 404(b) evidence on its 
own accord; however, the 404(b) evidence from the girlfriend was not included 
in that notice. (See R. 40-42.) 
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(R. 280:193-94.) During this line of questioning, Mr. Courtney's trial counsel 
never objected. 
The 404(b) evidence from the girlfriend was not admissible. If the trial court had 
addressed the 404(b) evidence elicited from the girlfriend (either through ruling 
on an objection or ruling on the issue after Mr. Courtney received notice from the 
State), it would have deemed that evidence inadmissible. As noted above, 
admissible "evidence of prior bad acts must be (1] relevant and [2] offered for a 
genuine, noncharacter purpose; furthermore, [3] the probative value of the 
evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,r 13. The trial court would have had to apply this 
test to the evidence as it pertained to the two charges against Mr. Courtney: 
possession with intent to distribute and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
For possession with intent to distribute charge, the girlfriend's evidence is 
improper, irrelevant, and highly prejudicial. The girlfriend testified about Mr. 
Courtney's personal use of drugs, including his preference for using a needle. (R. 
280:193-94.) But prior personal use of drugs has no relevance on whether Mr. 
Courtney intended to distribute the drugs that were found in the car. See United 
States v. Cook, 454 F.3d 938, 941-42 (8th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that mere possession 
offense was minimally probative on whether defendant had intent to distribute); 
Haywood, 280 F .3d at 721 ("Haywood's possession of a small quantity of crack 
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cocaine for personal use on one occasion, in other words, sheds no light on 
whether he intended to distribute crack cocaine in his possession on another 
occasion.... . . ") 
Furthermore, the girlfriend's testimony about Mr. Courtney distributing 
on prior occasions was highly prejudicial. As noted above, courts evaluate 
several factors to determine whether evidence is too prejudicial, including "the 
strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities 
between the crimes, [ and] the interval of time that has elapsed between the 
crimes," among others. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ,I 24 (quotation omitted). The factors 
weigh heavily in Mr. Courtney's favor. Here, the strength of the girlfriend's 
evidence of Mr. Courtney's prior distribution is weak-it is merely her word. 
The girlfriend gives no details about how Mr. Courtney distributed, so gauging 
similarities is impossible. Also because of lack of detail, the record is devoid of 
information about the interval of time that passed between the time the girlfriend 
saw Mr. Courtney distribute and the offenses in this case. Here, "[t]he only way 
to reach the conclusion that the person currently has the intent to possess and 
distribute based solely on evidence of unrelated prior ... drug distribution is by 
employing the very kind of reasoning-i.e., once a drug dealer, always a drug 
dealer-which 404(b) excludes." Bell, 516 F.3d at 444. The girlfriend's evidence 
cast Mr. Courtney as a long-time drug dealer who had sold drugs before and was 
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intending to sell them again. The girlfriend's evidence was either too prejudicial 
or entirely irrelevant to the possession with intent to distribute charge and was 
therefore inadmissible. 
For the possession of drug paraphernalia charge the girlfriend's testimony 
about Mr. Courtney's drug distribution was completely irrelevant and 
prejudicial. Evidence is relevant if it has the tendency to make some fact of 
consequence more or less probable, and the evidence must "tend to prove some 
fact that is material to the crime charged." Lucero, 2014UT15,117 (quotation 
omitted). For possession of drug paraphernalia, the State must prove that Mr. 
Courtney was "possess[ing] with intent to use ... drug paraphernalia to ... 
store, contain, conceal, inject ... or otherwise introduce a controlled substance 
into the human body." Utah Code§ 58-37a-5(1). Whether or not Mr. Courtney 
distributed drugs in the past did not tend to prove any material fact in the drug 
paraphernalia charge. Furthermore, the girlfriend's drug distribution evidence 
was prejudicial: selling drugs and merely possessing drug paraphernalia are 
vastly different crimes; there was no information about the time difference 
between when the girlfriend saw Mr. Courtney distribute drugs and when the 
offenses occurred in this case; and no need exists for the drug distribution 
evidence as it pertains to the drug paraphernalia charge. Therefore, the 
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girlfriend's evidence about prior distribution as it pertained to the drug 
paraphernalia charge was irrelevant and prejudicial and was inadmissible. 
Under the 404(b) test, the girlfriend's testimony was inadmissible. Had Mr. 
Courtney's trial counsel requested notice of 404(b) evidence, the State would 
have been required to disclose the girlfriend's testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 
404(b ). As detailed above, the trial court would have addressed the 404(b) issue 
and determined that the girlfriend's testimony was inadmissible. Trial counsel's 
failure to request notice prevented the trial court from II carefully consider[ing] 
whether [the evidence] is genuinely being offered for a proper, non-character 
purpose, or whether it might actually be aimed at sustaining an improper 
inference of action in conformity with a person's bad character." Verde, 2012 UT 
60, ,r 18. 
Had Mr. Courtney's trial counsel objected to the girlfriend's testimony, the 
trial court would have also determined that the girlfriend's testimony was 
inadmissible under the 404(b) analysis explained above; the objection would not 
have been futile. And no sound tactical basis exists for not objecting. The 
girlfriend's testimony was highly prejudicial and cast Mr. Courtney has a 
perpetual drug dealer. As the Wyoming Supreme Court stated, "[I]n failing to 
demand notice of 404(b) evidence, request a pre-trial hearing to determine its 
admissibility, [and] enter an objection to the testimony ... defense counsel failed 
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to render such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent 
attorney." Fennell v. State, 2015 WY 67, 1 60, 350 P.3d 710. "[W]e cannot conceive 
of a reasonable attorney forfeiting the opportunity to prevent the jury from 
hearing evidence of his client's prior crimes, wrongs or acts." Id. (quotation 
omitted). "We similarly cannot conceive of a reasonable attorney forfeiting the 
opportunity to prevent the jury from hearing that his client, who professed his 
innocence to the crimes of delivery of cocaine, was a drug dealer." Id. Because 
the girlfriend's testimony was inadmissible under Rule 404(b ), and because no 
reasonable trial strategy existed for not requesting notice and for not objecting, 
Mr. Courtney's trial counsel performed deficiently. 
Mr. Courtney was prejudiced. The admission of the girlfriend's testimony 
prejudiced Mr. Courtney. Had her testimony been excluded, Mr. Courtney's trial 
would have turned out differently because II other strong evidence" of Mr. 
Courtney's guilt did not exist. See Alvarado, 2014 UT App 87,128. Mr. Courtney 
was not caught attempting to sell drugs; he was arrested in a parking lot while 
he was looking for a neighbor's lost child. (R. 280:109-10.) In fact, Mr. Courtney 
had no drugs on him when he was arrested. (R. 280:111-12.) The police found the 
methamphetamine in the girlfriend's car that Mr. Courtney had been driving 
earlier that day, and the girlfriend had the keys at the time the police arrested 
Mr. Courtney. (R. 280:121-22.) The girlfriend's evidence that Mr. Courtney had 
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sold drugs was crucial for the State to prove that Mr. Courtney intended to sell 
the drugs in the car. 7 
2.3 Mr. Courtney has filed a Rule 23B motion properly alleging his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena a witness 
Concurrent with this brief, Mr. Courtney has filed a Utah R. App. P. 23B 
motion requesting remand . .uRule 23B motions are available only in limited 
circumstances, to supplement the record with known facts needed for an 
appellant to assert an ineffectiveness of counsel claim on direct appeal." State v. 
Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, ,r 15,317 P.3d 968 (quotation omitted). A Rule 23B 
motion must "(1) contain a nonspeculative allegation of facts that (2) do not fully 
appear in the record, which, if true, (3) could support a determination that 
counsel's performance was deficient, and ( 4) demonstrate that the defendant 
suffered prejudice as a result." Id. Additionally, Rule 23B motions must "be 
accompanied by affidavits ... that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the 
7 In the unlikely event that the State argues that Mr. Courtney's trial counsel 
did request notice or that there was some sort of open file arrangement between 
the two parties, the girlfriend's 404(b) testimony would still be inadmissible. H 
the prosecution fails to give notice after defendant requests notice of 404(b) 
evidence, that 404(b) evidence may be inadmissible. United States v. Vega, 188 
F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Pretrial notice, or an excuse from the district 
court for failing to give notice, is a condition to the admission of other acts 
evidence."). 
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appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 
23B(b). Mr. Courtney has requested remand to supplement the record on 
whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena an important 
witness. 
Upon remand, the evidence will show that Mr. Courtney's trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to subpoena a witness, Missy Amy. During the trial, a 
police officer testified that an owe sheet-a list of names and amounts of money 
written on a piece of paper-was found on Mr. Courtney. (R. 280:111-12.) The 
officer testified that drug dealers typically use owe sheets to keep track of what is 
owed to them. (R. 280:112.) The officer said that he asked Mr. Courtney about the 
owe sheet, and Mr. Courtney testified that it was not his. (R. 280:117.) Mr. 
Courtney testified that the owe sheet was not his and was in fact Missy Amy's. 
(R. 281:55-57.) He testified that Ms. Amy had loaned money to others, and he 
was using the owe sheet to collect on the debts owed to her. (Id.) Ms. Amy did 
not testify at the trial. 
Mr. Courtney produced with this brief and with his Rule 23B Motion an 
affidavit from his trial counsel. His counsel states that before Mr. Courtney's 
trial, trial counsel "met with a potential witness, Missy Amy." (Young Aff. ,r 2.) 
According to trial counsel, Ms. Amy told him "that the owe sheet that was found 
on Mr. Courtney was hers." (Young Aff. ,r 3.) Moreover, Ms. Amy told trial 
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counsel "that she would voluntarily attend Mr. Courtney's trial" so trial counsel 
did not subpoena her. (Young Aff. ,r,r 4-5.) But Ms. Amy did not show up at trial 
to testify. (Young Aff. ,r 6.) 
Mr. Courtney's trial counsel performed deficiently when he failed to 
subpoena Ms. Amy. From trial counsel's nonspeculative assertions in his 
affidavit, Ms. Amy's testimony would have been helpful to Mr. Courtney; her 
testimony would have supported his story that the owe sheet was hers and that 
Mr. Courtney was acting on her behalf to secure her debt, not selling drugs. See 
State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18, ,r 28 (holding that under Rule 23B affidavits may be 
"from individuals other than the potential witness"). The owe sheet was essential 
to the State's argument that Mr. Courtney was intending to distribute drugs. (See 
R. 280:116.) 
Even though Ms. Amy was an important witness for Mr. Courtney's 
defense, Mr. Courtney's trial counsel failed to "take reasonable steps to secure 
[her testimony]." See State v. Charles, 2011 UT App 291, ,r 30,263 P.3d 469 
(reasoning that defense counsel performed deficiently when he failed to 
subpoena a helpful witness because he erroneously believed that the State would 
call that witness to testify); see also Gregg v. Rockview, 596 F. App'x 72, 77-78 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (reasoning that defense counsel performed deficiently when he did not 
ensure the attendance of an unreliable key witness through a subpoena). The 
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process of obtaining a subpoena is not burdensome or costly. See Utah R. Crim. 
P. 14. But because trial counsel erroneously assumed that Ms. Amy would 
appear at trial, he failed to take the necessary steps to ensure Ms. Amy's 
attendance. Because trial counsel failed to subpoena an important witness, 
counsel's performance was deficient. 
Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to subpoena Ms. 
Amy. In its cross examination of Mr. Courtney, the State questioned Mr. 
Courtney why Ms. Amy was not at the trial. (R. 281:72.) And when Mr. 
Courtney's wife testified that the owe sheet was Ms. Amy's, the State questioned 
her about why Ms. Amy needed Mr. Courtney to collect the money, and the wife 
could not definitively say why. (R. 281:43-44.) Ms. Amy's testimony would have 
clearly supported Mr. Courtney's story that the owe sheet was not his. (Young 
Aff. ,r 3.) And because the owe sheet was key to the State's argument that Mr. 
Courtney intended to distribute drugs, it is likely that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. 
Because the record does not show evidence of Mr. Courtney's counsel not 
subpoenaing Ms. Amy and of Ms. Amy's potential testimony, and because Mr. 
Courtney's counsel performed deficiently and Mr. Courtney was prejudiced, this 
Court should grant Mr. Courtney a Rule 23B remand so that he can supplement 
the record. 
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Conclusion 
This Court should reverse Mr. Courtney's convictions because the trial 
court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of Mr. Courtney's 2012 
conviction W1der Rule 404(b ). The evidence was highly prejudicial to Mr. 
Courtney and not sufficiently probative of his intent to distribute drugs. 
Moreover, this Court should reverse Mr. Courtney's convictions because 
his trial counsel was ineffective. First, his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the evidence of the underlying facts of the 2012 conviction. Second, his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to request notice of 404(b) evidence and then 
failing to object to that evidence at trial. That404(b) evidence was inadmissible 
and prejudicial to Mr. Courtney. Finally, Mr. Courtney has requested remand to 
supplement the record with facts that his counsel failed to subpoena an 
important witness and Mr. Courtney was prejudiced by the absence of that 
witness. 
DATED this 4th day of September, 2015. 
EmilyA~ 
ADAMS LEGAL LLC 
1310 Madera Hills Drive 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
eadams@adamslegalllc.com 
(801) 309-9625 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Carl Courtney 
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• • 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL MA.CK COURTNEY, 
Defendant. 
PRESENT 
Clerk: zoilab 
Prosecutor: HEWARD, GARY R 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING APP 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 131900508 FS 
Judge: MICHAEL DIREDA 
Date: Decemb r 30, 2013 
Defendant 1 s Attorney(s): SEAN YOUNG 
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
I 
I 
I 
·' Date of birth: August 12, 1968 
Audio 
Tape Number: 2Dl23013 Tape Count: 10:49-11:02 
DEC 3 o 20t, 
CHARGES 
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/05/2013 Guilty 
2. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/05/2013 Guilty 
HEARING 
Defendant present in the custody of Weber County Jail. 
Defense counsel requests a deviation from the prison 
recommendation. 
Defendant addresses the Court. 
Court makes prefacing comments. 
State addresses the prison recommendation and the defendant's 
criminal history. 
The Court makes a record regarding the sentence in this case 
running consecutively as opposed to concurrently with the 
defendant's other sentences. 
It is the judgment and sentence of this court that the defendant 
serve a term not to exceed Oto 6 months at the Utah State Prison 
on count 2. 
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Case No: 131900508 Date: Dec 30, 2013 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST 
C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
These sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutive 
to the sentences imposed in case no. 121900920, 121901670 and· 
121901671. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends the defendant be considered for a substance 
abuse treatment such as Con-Quest, Drug Board or some other 
program. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Date: /q bo(,::, 
Printed: 12/30/13 13:18:05 Page 2 (last) 
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Utah R. Evid. 404 
( a) Character Evidence. 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not 
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity 
with the character or trait. 
(2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case. The following 
exceptions apply in a criminal case: 
(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant's pertinent trait, 
and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut 
it; 
(B) subject to the limitations in Rule 412, a defendant may offer 
evidence of an alleged victim's pertinent trait, and if the evidence is 
admitted, the prosecutor may: 
(i) offer evidence to rebut it; and 
(ii) offer evidence of the defendant's same trait; and 
(C) in a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer evidence of the 
alleged victim's trait of peacefulness to rebut evidence that the victim was 
the first aggressor. 
(3) Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness's character may be 
admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts. 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 
admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in conformity with the character. 
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be 
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. 
On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must: 
(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such 
evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and 
(B) do so before trial, or during trial if the court excuses lack of 
pretrial notice on good cause shown. 
(c) Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child-Molestation Cases. 
(1) Permitted Uses. In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of 
child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed 
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any other acts of child molestation to prove a propensity to commit the crime 
charged. 
(2) Disclosure. If the prosecution intends to offer this evidence it shall 
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown. 
(3) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed 
in relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, 
be a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense. 
(4) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise 
admissible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence. 
Utah Code§ 58-37-8(1) 
(1) Prohibited acts A -- Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which 
results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 
37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a 
position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of 
management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or 
II, a controlled substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as 
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listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III 
or IV, or marijuana, or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty 
of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction 
is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on 
his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in 
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of 
not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
Utah Code§ 58-37a-5(1) 
(1) (a) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, 
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this 
chapter. 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (1)(a) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
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ADDENDUMC 
State's Notice of 404(b) Evidence (R. 40-44) 
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GAGE H. ARNOLD, UBN. 13035 
DEE W. SMITH, UBN. 8688 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 W ASmNGTON BL VD., STE. 230 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: 801.399.8377 
FACSIMILE: 801.399.8304 
'. .~: . , . . ..... . 
. ·-. ; 
AUG 2 8 2013 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL MACK COURTNEY, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF STATE'S INTENT TO 
ADMIT 404(B) EVIDENCE AND 
SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM 
Case No. 131900508 
Judge: Michael D. DiReda 
The State, by and through Deputy Weber County Attorney Gage H. Arnold, hereby 
notifies the Court and the Defendant of its intent to admit non-character evidence under Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. In this case, the Defendant is charged with Possession of 
a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute (Methamphetamine) and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia. Descriptions of the 404(b) evidence and the State's supporting argument are set 
forth below. See Utah R Evid. 404(b)(2)(A) (2012) (requiring the prosecutor to provide 
reasonable notice of the general nature of the evidence sought to be admitted at trial). 
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Case No. 121901670 
On March 20, 2012, agents from the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force (Strike 
Force) conducted a buy operation using a confidential infonnant and an W1dercover Strike Force 
agent. Agent Jason Vanderwarf, in an undercover capacity, entered into a motel room with the 
confidential infonnant and observed the Defendant sell a quantity of suspected 
methamphetamine to the confidential informant. The Utah Crime Lab tested the substance and 
confirmed it was methamphetamine. The Defendant was tried and convicted of this offense. 
Case No. 121901671 
On July 27, 2012, members of the Strike Force were conducting a buy/rip operation in 
Ogden, Utah when Agent V anderwarf observed the Defendant outside of a residence. At this 
point the Strike Force sought to arrest the Defendant for two prior charges. Agent Vanderwarf 
took the Defendant into custody and transported to the Weber County Correctional Facility. 
While at the jail, the Defendant was found in possession of methamphetamine in a hidden 
compartment of a lock. The Defendant, post-Miranda, made admissions to Strike Force agents. 
The substance flash tested positive for amphetamines, and the Utah Crime Lab tested the 
substance. Defense counsel should have a copy of this police report. 
Case No. 121900920 
On January 26. 2012, officers of the Ogden Police Department stopped a vehicle for a 
traffic violation. As an officer approached the passenger side of the vehicle, the Defendant threw 
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a cigarette out of the window. The officer spoke with the Defendant and later verified that he 
had an active warrant for his arrest. The officers received consent to search the vehicle and 
found suspected methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia inside of a blue bag. After 
acknowledgment and waiver his Miranda rights, the Defendant admitted the items inside of the 
blue bag were his. The Defendant possessed the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia 
within 1,000 feet of a drug free zone. The Utah Crime Lab analyzed the substance and 
confmned it is methamphetamine. 
ARGUMENT 
Generally, "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 
person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in confonnity 
with the character." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(l) (2013). Crimes, wrongs, or other acts, however, 
"may be admissible for another pw-pose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Id. Before the 
Court can allow 404(b) evidence to be admitted it must undergo a three-step process. 
First, the trial court must ... determine whether the bad acts evidence is being 
offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as one of those specifically listed 
in rule 404(b). In contrast, if the trial court concludes that the bad acts evidence is 
being offered only to show the defendant's propensity to commit crime, then it is 
inadmissible and must be excluded at that point. If the purpose is deemed proper, 
the court must [next] determine whether the bad acts evidence meets the 
requirements of rule 402, which permits admission of only relevant evidence. 
Last, the court must analyze the evidence in light of rule 403 to assess whether its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant. 
Page 3 of 6 
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State v. Marcher, 2009 UT App 262,129, 219 P.3d 75 (omission and alteration in original) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, No. 20090817 (Utah, December 
10, 2009). 
A. Proper, Noncharacter Purpose 
Here, the State intends to admit evidence of the Defendant's two subsequent drug related 
offenses to prove the Defendant's intent, knowledge or identity in addition to any absence of 
mistake or lack of accident. Id. The State would seek to admit the evidence described above on 
rebuttal if the Defendant were to testify to or Defense Counsel were to imply through cross-
examination conflicting accounts related to areas allowed under Rule 404(b). 
B. Relevancy Under Rule 402 
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence explains that relevant evidence is admissible 
unless the evidence is irrelevant, or is prohibited under the United States or Utah Constitutions, 
Utah statute, or Utah court rules. See Utah R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if ''it has any 
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence ... and the 
fact is of consequence in detennining the action." Here, the Court should find the drug related 
cases are relevant to determining the Defendant's intent, knowledge, or identity. The cases 
would also make it more probable that there was an absence of mistake or lack of accident. 
C. Probative Value vs. Unfair Prejudice, et aL 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that the Court may "exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
Page 4 of6 
000043 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. Again, the State would call 
rebuttal witnesses related to the cases described above if the Defendant were to testify in a 
contradictory fashion or Defense Counsel were to attack through cross examination the State's 
case as it pertains to intent, knowledge, or identity, or that a mistake, misunderstanding, or 
accident has taken place. 
CONCLUSION 
THEREFORE, the Court should admit the State's 404(b) evidence against the Defendant 
because it is based on a proper, noncharacter purpose, relevant, and the evidence's value is not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading 
the jury, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, or needlessly presenting cwnulative evidence. 
}k 
DATED this 12 day of August, 2013. 
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ADDENDUMD 
Transcript of the district court's ruling on the 
State's 404(b) evidence (R. 280:4-20) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(The following proceedings are being held in Chambers.) 
THE COURT: All right. Let's turn to the matter 
State of Utah versus Carl Mack Courtney. This is 131900508. 
Counsel are present, Mr. Arnold representing the State and 
Mr. Young representing the defendant. The defendant, 
Mr. Courtney, is currently in the holding cell changing his 
clothes. 
4 
Counsel came back to meet with the Court prior to the 
commencement of jury selection to discuss any loose-end issues 
that needed to be addressed outside of the presence of the jury 
so we're on the record in chambers and there are a couple of 
evidentiary issues that need to be addressed. The first of 
which is a 404 issue. So I'm going to turn the record over to 
Mr. Arnold and if you'll make your motion, Mr. Arnold, and 
then, Mr. Young, I'll hear from you and then, Mr. Arnold, I'll 
give you one last opportunity to respond. 
MR. ARNOLD: Okay. We have filed a notice of an 
intent to introduce 404(b) evidence at trial. The 404(b) 
evidence relates to the distribution of methamphetamine from 
the Value Place Motel/Hotel that Jason Vanderwarf was involved 
with. We intend to call him tomorrow as a witness. This would 
go to the 404 -- different 404(b) factors which include proving 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake or lack of absence, lack of 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
accident, excuse me. 
THE COURT: All right. So just to be clear, let's 
set up the chronology, the other bad act that you intend to 
introduce to this jury occurred when? 
I 
5 
MR. ARNOLD: It took place in March of 2000 
believe it was in the spring of 2012. I can't recall it was 
2012, but I can't recall was it early spring? It's the case 
that we've already tried and he was found guilty of. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ARNOLD: And then the other evidence which in 
part isn't -- I mean, we would argue isn't -- there's a part of 
it that's 404(b) and then there's a part that's just a straight 
admission where during that incident at the Value Place Motel 
Mr. Courtney wasn't arrested because it was an undercover 
operation and he was later arrested at a different drug 
operation where agents observed him. 
They had -- there's kind of a standoff in the street 
between a confidential informant and a drug dealer. 
Mr. Courtney was there present at the same location. Agent 
Vanderwarf -- or he was arrested and he was interviewed by 
Agent Vanderwarf. Agent Vanderwarf Mirandized him and he 
waived his rights and he then admitted that he sells 
methamphetamine. I believe that the correct term was enough to 
get by. 
THE COURT: And this was in the prior case that we --
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
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MR. YOUNG: No, that's a case that we haven't filed 
motions on. That evidence might be suppressed. I mean that 
could all be suppressed. I don't think that can come in today 
at all. That's a third trial that's forthcoming. 
MR. ARNOLD: And that's also part of our 404(b) 
motion or notice I should say. 
MR. YOUNG: If you want to get into the facts of that 
case, they arrested him pursuant to an alleged warrant. I've 
since gone back and checked the warrant base and there was no 
warrant for him, so we'd be filing a motion to suppress that 
entire case because Detective Vanderwarf says there's a warrant 
out for him, for his arrest. 
MR. ARNOLD: It wasn't a -- sorry. Go ahead. 
MR. YOUNG: I mean, we're talking about a whole third 
case. Now, there's an alleged warrant out for his arrest. 
They took him into custody based on a warrant which didn't 
exist so we'll be filing our own motions on that case which I 
don't think can even be addressed as 404(b) evidence because 
it's an allegation right now. He hasn't been convicted of it. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think there has to be a 
conviction, first of all, under 404. I'm not saying that I 
by saying that I'm not saying I think it should come in, but 
I'm just establishing at least that there does not have to be a 
conviction. It's just another bad act. It could be another 
crime, wrong or act which is what the rule says. Let's 
COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT 
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establish 
MR. ARNOLD: Can I just address one thing that --
THE COURT: Yeah, that's fine, but I want to stay in 
a sequential way. I don't want to spin around all over the 
place and have all these issues overlapping. 
MR. ARNOLD: Sure. 
THE COURT: So let's talk about the March 2012 or 
Spring of 2012 incident that occurred that the Court -- that 
the defendant had a jury trial on recently and was convicted 
that you now seek to introduce in this case which occurred 
on --
MR. ARNOLD: 
August 26th , 2010. 
THE COURT: 
MR. YOUNG: 
THE COURT: 
This case which occurred on 
All right. So this case --
March 20th, 2012. 
The case that we are scheduled to try 
today occurred two years before the case that Mr. Courtney was 
convicted of most recently and so it isn't as we often hear a 
prior bad act but rather a subsequent bad act just to be clear 
again for the benefit of our record. And the specific -- you 
listed all of the other non-character reasons, but you didn't 
specify which in particular you are focusing on for purposes of 
this other bad act. 
MR. ARNOLD: It would certainly go -- I mean, this 
case is a possession with intent to distribute given the amount 
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of methamphetamine. Mr. Courtney was found to have an owe 
sheet in his pocket and also approximately 60 individual 
baggies and he also had a pretty large pocket knife on him 
which he admits to Officer Johnson at that time was for 
protection. Nine grams of methamphetamine was tested at the 
crime lab from this 2010 incident. 
Agent Johnson's testimony will be that that is a 
distributable amount of methamphetamine, that on the street 
it's worth approximately 900 to -- 600 to $900. 
THE COURT: We're on the record. I'm sorry. 
8 
MR. ARNOLD: So it would go to his intent, and based 
on the cross-examination, any absence of mistake or lack of 
accident and any motive that he would have for that 
methamphetamine. 
THE COURT: The crime that he was convicted of 
previously from Spring of 2012 was what? 
MR. ARNOLD: Distribution of methamphetamine of a 
controlled substance, a second-degree felony. 
THE COURT: And so you're arguing that the 
distribution incident, conviction or otherwise, is properly 
used in this case to demonstrate? 
MR. ARNOLD: His intent 
MR. YOUNG: Mr. Young. 
MR. ARNOLD: primarily. And then 
MR. YOUNG: His intent to distribute in this case? 
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MR. ARNOLD: Yes. 
THE COURT: And just to be clear that because he has 
distributed --
MR. ARNOLD: On subsequent occasion. 
THE COURT: -- on a subsequent occasion, working 
backwards you're using that to establish that the reason he was 
in possession of the drugs that are at issue in the case today 
was for the purpose of distribution because he has shown that 
he distributes methamphetamine? 
MR. ARNOLD: Yes. However, you know, there's a 
proposed jury instruction that the State has filed with the 
Court indicating that the jurors can only use that evidence for 
the proper 404(b) factors. 
THE COURT: Okay. Response. 
MR. YOUNG: I guess I don't understand how that 
incident subsequent to the case we're trying today shows that 
he had an intent to distribute in this case. I mean, I just 
don't understand the argument, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is the nine grams in our case today of 
methamphetamine? 
MR. ARNOLD: It is. 
THE COURT: So the drug is the same? 
MR. ARNOLD: Uh-huh. 
MR. YOUNG: I guess the facts are so distinguishable 
in this case or the prior case convicted of drugs. He's in the 
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10 
room with the drugs, undercover buy operation. In this case 
the police pick him up on the street, drive him back to a 
location where the drugs are found in the car which he is not 
in possession of. He had turned the keys back over to the 
owner and relinquished control of the car with every intent to 
never enter the car again. He turned the keys back over to the 
owner. 
They then go. The police gets consent from the owner 
to search the car and finds drugs. I don't understand how that 
again shows the --
THE COURT: I guess the concern I have, Mr. Arnold, 
is just the two year delay. I mean, we're not talking about 
the next month or even six months. We're talking about two 
years later he's convicted of distribution and so now we're 
going to use his distribution conviction working backwards two 
years prior and say that because he was distributing in 2012, 
that means that the drugs he was in possession of in 2010 were 
being possessed with intent to distribute? That's the problem 
that I have. 
I'm not saying that it doesn't bear on that question, 
but I guess what I'm saying is how does it not really look more 
or smell more like propensity evidence and less on the 
non-character reasons? I mean, how does the jury not say oh 
he's a drug dealer. Okay. I get it. So now that means he was 
probably possessing with the intent to distribute before 
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because he's a drug dealer. 
I mean, isn't that the very propensity evidence that 
404 is seeking to keep out? 
MR. ARNOLD: It can go to his intent, though. I 
mean, the rule is very specific and it says that it goes to his 
intent on a different occasion. 
THE COURT: And you don't think --
MR. ARNOLD: The rule is what the rule is. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. ARNOLD: And that is one of the proper avenues 
for 404(b) evidence. There isn't a temporal restraint, you 
know. 
THE COURT: How far out in terms of temporal 
proximity do you think you can go before the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial nature of the 
evidence? 
MR. ARNOLD: Well, if you're going to go a little --
I mean 403 is one of the -- obviously the ultimate, I guess, 
gatekeeper functions that the Court has. It's extremely 
probative in this case especially where he's disclaiming 
ownership. Part of the evidence that we'll put on is that 
Mr. Courtney claims, although I believe that the my 
understanding is that the witnesses will testify as to 
otherwise -- that somebody else came and threw a black bag of 
methamphetamine inside of a car randomly, a car that he had 
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driven the morning of, a car that there will be testimony, I 
expect, that where the black bag was sitting on top of his 
jacket. 
It will also go to in the absence of 
misunderstanding as far as attributing, you know, possession to 
him. I mean, his defense is I didn't do this and so it goes to 
his intent and any absence of. 
THE COURT: Other than the drugs that are the same, I 
mean, meaning methamphetamine in both cases, are there any 
other similarities that bear on this intent? In other words, 
the baggies. Did they have a decal or some sort of a logo on 
them that were common to both cases? 
MR. ARNOLD: I haven't even looked at that. There 
were small baggies used in each case. He had about 60 of them 
in this 2010 case and he only, you know, was convicted for 
distributing a small baggy, you know, of the same size in the 
2012 case. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Young, additional argument 
that you wish to make? 
MR. YOUNG: I think the facts are so distinct in this 
case (inaudible) it's more prejudicial to the fact that he was 
convicted on a subsequent case, I think that this case should 
stand on its own then. If their evidence proves in this case 
he was distributing, I think it should stand by itself. I do 
think, like you said, to introduce a prior distribution charge, 
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Like I said, the facts are completely different in 
this case. In the prior case it was a confidential informant 
undercover agent, an arranged buy. There's no arranged buy in 
this case. He's found several hundred yards from the car. 
He's not in control of the car. The keys are actually 
relinquished to the owner of the car who then consents to 
search. I think the facts are so distinct in this case that 
it's going to be more prejudicial to my client than probative. 
THE COURT: So here's how I view it. I am troubled, 
I must admit, with the two year delay. I'm not troubled with 
the other bad act being a subsequent bad act. I think we've 
established that they don't have to be prior bad acts. I'm 
troubled by the two year gap, but I don't think that there is 
case law that suggests that the subsequent bad act must be 
relatively contemporaneous to the case within which you're 
seeking to use the other bad act. 
Having said that, the further away we get I think the 
less that other bad act evidence is probative. I mean, you 
start getting far enough down the line and you could see a 
scenario in which, I mean, carried out to its logical extremes 
you've got an other bad act that occurred 30 years before or 
after the case in which you're seeking to use it and you start 
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saying okay is it really -- does it really bear on the question 
of intent? I'm just simply 
MR. ARNOLD: Could I just -- before you make a 
ruling, one other thing. Mr. Courtney on this case went to 
prison for a probation violation so he went into prison. He 
was in prison for an extended period of time and then he hits 
the streets. And I can tell you because on the recording they 
actually discuss how long he was in prison which we've excised. 
That's another issue we need to address, but they discuss that 
he went to prison for an extended period of time because his 
probation had been revoked. And so he hits the streets again 
in 2012 or approximately thereafter and then boom. So that 
shortens the --
THE COURT: Well, I'm not suggesting that the State 
did something inappropriate by waiting two years to bring it up 
or something of that nature. I'm just saying that as I look at 
how it bears on it, I think temporal proximity does have to be 
factored in. Now, as I read the rule, obviously 404(b), two 
says permitted uses and it talks about notice in a criminal 
case and it says this evidence may be admissible for another 
purpose such as proving motive, opportunity, intent. 
And intent is of particular importance in this 
particular case because we have the charge that's pending today 
of position with intent to distribute. And that with intent 
language is key because it differentiates between a simple 
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15 
So the jury has to consider for what purpose was he 
possessing the methamphetamine. Was his intent to possess it, 
to use it or was his intent to distribute it? And in that 
respect the prior distribution conviction, although it relates 
to an incident that occurred in 2012, two years after this 
intent to distribute charge is alleged to have occurred, I 
think the fact that he is or has been convicted of a 
distribution offense bears on the issue of what his intent was 
in possessing the methamphetamine in this case. 
There is certainly other evidence that will bear on 
that. The quantity of baggies, the owe sheets, the particular 
weight of methamphetamine, but I think that the fact that he 
has been charged and convicted of distribution of 
methamphetamine also bears on this question of intent. 
So I don't find that the evidence is substantially 
more prejudicial than probative. It is certainly prejudicial, 
there's no question about it, but it is also extremely 
probative and so I'm going to allow this particular 404(b) 
evidence to be introduced in this trial. 
MR. YOUNG: And you're discussing the conviction not 
the --
THE COURT: Well, we haven't gotten to that yet. I'm 
focusing exclusively on this distribution conviction, the prior 
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case that we tried and that's all I'm ruling on at this point. 
Now, let's talk about the next 404(b) issue. 
MR. ARNOLD: Well, we intended to call Jason 
Vanderwarf to testify and put on the facts of that buy that the 
Court heard from the last trial. We have the same recording 
ready. We intend to put on those facts because his voice on 
that recording, the jurors can put that, piece that part of the 
puzzle. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't want to spend an inordinate 
amount of time re-trying that other case. 
MR. ARNOLD: I understand. 
THE COURT: And if we're going to spend 30 minutes 
with the agent from this last case that we tried where he was 
convicted going in and talking about the buy, playing the 
tape-recording from the buy and all of that, I guess I'm a 
little bit concerned about that. I mean 
MR. ARNOLD: I mean is it just for how long it will 
take? 
THE COURT: Well -- I guess. 
MR. ARNOLD: It's the State's case as far as --
THE COURT: I understand, but remind me again of what 
is said during the exchange that makes this so probative. 
MR. ARNOLD: The fact the arrangement was that they 
would buy $60 worth of methamphetamine, $60 was given to the 
CI, Vanderwarf sees Carl Courtney at the table, the CI gives 
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THE COURT: He wants to introduce evidence of what 
occurred in the prior case, not just that he was convicted of 
it for 404 purposes, but he wants to get into the particular 
details of it. That's what I'm trying to understand is why 
they are really in this case. Why it isn't adequate to simply 
say he was convicted of distribution and he was arrested and 
charged and convicted of distribution of meth. What more does 
the jury need to know? 
I mean telling them all about what occurred unless 
there's a common plan or scheme that you're going to argue that 
makes the particular facts relevant, I just don't know why it 
helps. That's what I'm trying to understand. 
MR. ARNOLD: We can do it either way. I mean Jason 
Vanderwarf would be called and we can talk about the other 
incident. And I was just going to lay the foundation and put 
it on. I mean we can put on a certified copy of distribution 
of methamphetamine and that would be fine too, you know, I 
mean, what happens is that his voice is the same on his jail 
phone call identifying him as Carl Courtney. I guess it just 
becomes an issue as far as what Mr. Young wants to do in his 
defense, if that makes sense? 
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Mr. Young, do you want to speak to it? 
As far as the facts of the prior 
THE COURT: Yeah, getting into exactly what occurred 
in that case as opposed to just simply letting the jury know 
that he distributed the methamphetamine in March of 2012. 
MR. YOUNG: So we're discussing Agent Vanderwarf's 
testimony that's going to come forward, how we're going to 
introduce his testimony? 
THE COURT: We're going to go down the road of Agent 
Vanderwarf explaining yet again what occurred in the prior 
case. Well, prior in terms of the case we just tried and he 
was convicted not --
MR. ARNOLD: Just one other thing. I mean, 
Vanderwarf would testify that it was a small baggy that was 
obtained. 
THE COURT: Is there something remarkable about that? 
MR. ARNOLD: That he had 60 -- he had 60 of them in 
his pockets when he was arrested in the 2010 case. 
THE COURT: But -- okay. I mean, I understand he had 
60 baggies on the 2010 case and when he distributed in 2012 it 
was a small baggy. 
MR. ARNOLD: Right. 
THE COURT: But, again, unless the baggies have some 
similarity to them. 
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MR. YOUNG: Aren't all drugs distributed in baggies? 
THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I'm wondering what's 
unique about those facts. That doesn't seem remarkable to me. 
MR. ARNOLD: Okay. 
THE COURT: I mean distribution usually involves a 
baggy. 
MR. ARNOLD: It does, but I'm just thinking of 
educating the jury, you know, people who have never, you know, 
probably purchased drugs or seen drugs in real life, just 
educating them to the fullest extent that I can. 
THE COURT: I think with respect to the specific 
facts in the case of 2012 that we just tried, I think my 
inclination is to disallow you getting into all those facts 
unless, unless there is similarity, a common plan or scheme. 
In other words, he did something in this distribution case that 
is similar, and I mean remarkable similar, not just baggy here, 
baggy here. 
I mean to me that's just standard operating procedure 
in the drug distribution arena, but if, for example, the baggy 
he distributed in the 2012 case had a logo on it and that logo 
is his signature, right? 
MR. ARNOLD: Right. 
THE COURT: And he was caught with 60 baggies that 
have the same logo or signature, then I think that's 
significant. If he refers to methamphetamine in a particular 
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way, you know, he calls it dope or he has some slang term for 
it and he used the term in the distribution case and also used 
the term or is overheard using the term with a witness in the 
other case. 
MR. ARNOLD: Right. 
THE COURT: To me that's relevant, but if we're just 
saying look he sold dope over here and he's in possession of 
dope over here that we contend he was intending to sell, I just 
don't see enough similarity there to take the time to go 
through all those facts again. 
MR. ARNOLD: Okay. That's fine. We would still want 
to call Jason Vanderwarf for the purpose of introducing the 
defendant's admissions that he sells methamphetamine. 
THE COURT: That he made in the distribution case? 
MR. YOUNG: The third one. The third one that's 
upcoming. 
THE COURT: Does he make admissions in the case that 
he was convicted of? 
MR. ARNOLD: He was never interviewed at that time. 
He was subsequently interviewed. So what happens --
THE COURT: Following an arrest that Mr. Young may be 
challenging? 
MR. YOUNG: That's correct. I will be challenging. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ARNOLD: The whole issue as far as the warrant 
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Q 
A 
Please state your full name and spell it. 
It's Jason Vanderwarf, J-a-s-o-n, 
V-a-n-d-e-r-w-a-r-f. 
Q What do you do for a living? 
A I'm a police officer with the Roy City Police 
Department. 
Q Okay. Within the past few years have you been 
assigned to the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force? 
A 
Q 
Yes, I have. 
And as a part of that team, have you conducted 
undercover operations? 
A Yes, I have. 
Okay. Briefly describe what that entails? 
20 
Q 
A With the undercover operations it entails working 
directly with a confidential informant. We'll utilize the 
confidential informant to introduce us to their suppliers or 
their dealers to help us get in to be able to purchase drugs 
from the target that we're looking for. 
Q Okay. Were you working as a strike force agent on 
March 20th , 2012? 
day? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, I was. 
And were you working in an undercover capacity that 
Yes. 
And was there an operation that was conducted for the 
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purchase of methamphetamine? 
A Yes. 
Q Briefly describe what that operation entailed as far 
as what your understanding of the operation was? 
A I was told that one of our confidential informants 
was going to arrange the purchase of a small amount of 
methamphetamine from another individual known as Darryl 
Dickerson. The operation was to take place at the Value Mall 
located on 21 st Street approximately 1100 West 21 Street. 
We basically arranged $60 worth of methamphetamine. 
The informant was able to make contact with our initial target 
by phone. At that point the confidential informant was 
searched prior to the operation for any narcotics on his 
person. I then myself had a recording, visual and audio 
recording device on my person. That confidential informant had 
a recording device on his person. We then went to·the location 
of the Value Place Hotel. 
Q Let me just interrupt just one second. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
It's a hotel and not a mall? 
Correct. It's a hotel. 
Okay. 
Hotel/motel. 
Did you go up into a hotel room? 
Yes, we did. 
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Q Okay. Did you enter that hotel room with the 
confidential informant? 
A Yes. 
Q When you entered into the hotel room, what did you 
observe? 
A We entered in -- initially I was expecting to see one 
person that we were supposed to purchase the methamphetamine 
from. When we entered, there was actually three males and a 
female in the room which caught me off guard. One of the males 
was sitting on the bed, another male was sitting around a table 
area inside the room. The third male was just kind of 
wandering around in the kitchen where the female was also kind 
of located in this little kitchenette area. 
Initially the plan was to purchase the 
methamphetamine, like I said earlier, from a Darryl Dickerson. 
He was the individual that we were able to I.D. that was 
sitting on the bed. Instead of that the methamphetamine was, 
in fact, purchased from the defendant, Carl Courtney. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Is Mr. Courtney here today? 
Yes, he is. 
Can you identify him? 
Yes, he's sitting to his attorney's left. 
Okay. At that point once the transaction was 
conducted, did you leave? 
A Yes, I did. 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Okay. Did we recently have a trial on this? 
Yes, we did. 
Did it go to a jury verdict? 
Yes, it did. 
And what was that verdict? 
The verdict was guilty. 
Guilty of what? 
Of distribution of methamphetamine. 
MR. ARNOLD: State would move for admission of a 
certified copy of the guilty verdict. 
MR. YOUNG: No objection. 
THE COURT: What is the exhibit number? 
MR. ARNOLD: It is nine. 
THE COURT: Nine will be received. 
(State's Exhibit No. 9 was received into evidence.) 
23 
MR. ARNOLD: Thank you. No further questions at this 
time. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. YOUNG: 
Q Going back to that event with the undercover buy. 
There was actually several people in the room as you testified 
to, correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
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hold on. Strike that. 
While you dated Mr. Courtney, were you aware if he 
used any controlled substances? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Were you aware if he used methamphetamine? 
Yes. 
Did he use methamphetamine? 
Yes. 
Did you use methamphetamine with him? 
Yes. 
Were you present while he -- have you ever been 
present while he has used methamphetamine? 
A Yes. 
Q When you used methamphetamine with him, how did you 
obtain the methamphetamine? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
From him. 
How did he use methamphetamine? 
With a needle. 
By injecting? 
Yes. 
Q Directing your attention to State's Exhibit 2, the 
black pouch that you testified about, on that occasion do you 
recall if you were asked who this black pouch belonged to? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And what did you tell the officers? 
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A That it was Carl's. I had seen him keep his I.D. and 
social security card in it a time or two. 
Q Now, speaking of this black pouch, have you seen Mr. 
Courtney being in possession of this black pouch? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you seen him have methamphetamine inside of that 
black pouch? 
A Yes. 
Q During your relationship and while you were using 
methamphetamine with Mr. Courtney, have you seen him distribute 
or give methamphetamine to other people? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you seen him distribute or give methamphetamine 
to other people for money? 
A Yes. 
Q During the time -- strike that. 
Has Mr. Courtney called you from the Weber County 
Jail before? 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
Called you on multiple occasions? 
Yes. 
Q To the cell phone number that you had testified 
previously about? 
A Yes. 
Q Just to recap that's (801)686-0608? 
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IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
CARL MACK COURTNEY, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SEAN P. YOUNG 
App. Case No: 20141171-CA 
1. I was Appellant Carl Courtney's counsel in the district court in the 
above-named matter. 
2. Before Mr. Courtney's trial, I met with a potential witness, Missy 
Amy. 
3. Ms. Amy told me that the owe sheet that was found on Mr. 
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4. Ms. Amy told me that she would voluntarily attend Mr. Courtney's 
trial. 
5. Because of Ms. Amy's assertion, I did not subpoena her. 
6. Ms. Amy did not show up during Mr. Courtney's trial and 
consequently did not testify. 
Further Affiant saith naught. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
COUNTY OF DA VIS 
) 
) 
VERIFICATION 
On this Z- day of September 2015 personally appeared before me Emily 
Adams who duly acknowledge to me that she prepared the following Affida1.1it 
and knows the contents thereof to be correct. 
/-~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before )Ile this ; ;i day of Septe!_llber 2015. 
/~ -~/ 
la~-~----
1 '-Notary Publi~ 
\_,,, Commission # 4' 7 55i 11 
My Commission Expires 
/~- ,.zii 2.f}ti' 
S~ofUtah 
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